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Abstract 
I use credit/GDP ratio to construct stylized credit cycles at global and regional 
levels over 1980-2010. Their average duration is between 12 and 15 years and for 
all the regions there is “a ceiling” and “a floor” curbing the amplitude of credit 
cycles. They are also largely interconnected, with the US credit cycle being the 
most influential and autonomous at the same time. The relationship between credit 
cycles and intensity of banking crises is also discussed. It appears that the regions 
exerting predominant influence over their counterparts and having a higher number 
of total connections at the same time experience fewer banking crises.  
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1. Introduction 
The 2008-2009 global economic turmoil has translated into a growing number of 
research papers on the finance-business cycles nexus. Some authors argue that 
finance remains only a transmission mechanism of economic instability, triggered 
by real causes. The financial accelerator models illustrate this approach best 
(Coric, 2011). Others assert that finance has evolved into a self-sufficient 
determinant of  business cycles. So, the tightening of financing conditions by itself 
may significantly exacerbate business cycle dynamics, as was the case with the 
1990-91, 2001 and the past recessions in the US (Jermann, Quadrini, 2012).  
 Although financial situation is not the unique determinant of  business cycles 
and the link between them is not unidirectional, cyclical patterns of financial 
variables have begun exerting overwhelming influence on overall economic 
performance. Thus, the notion “financial cycles” has come to the fore. They 
encompass credit, housing and equity cycles. 
 Certain work has been done to figure out stylized facts about them. First, all 
the three cycles are pretty well synchronized across developed countries. Second, 
there are feedback effects between them – between housing and credit cycles, in 
particular. Third, financial cycles are characterized by significant, though not 
complete, concordance with business cycles (Claessens, Kose, Terrones, 2011a). 
Credit cycles demonstrate the most pronounced co-movement with business 
cycles, with Harding-Pagan concordance index equal to 0,81 (Claessens, Kose, 
Terrones, 2011b). 
 These stylized facts are subject to criticism as they refer to financial cycles 
in advanced economies and embrace the period 1960:1-2007:4, leaving out the 
Great Recession impact. Some empirical studies also question high concordance 
between credit and business cycles, stating that both have a life of their own 
(Credit Cycles and their Role for Macro-prudential Policy, 2011). So, to come to 
more robust conclusions, it is necessary to increase the number of countries in the 
sample. Selection of  cycle indicators also matter. In the papers cited aggregate 
claims on the private sector by deposit banks were used as a measure of credit 
cycles.  
In this paper I rely on the so-called financial depth measures of financial 
cycles. Speaking about credit cycles, I mean the share of domestic credit to private 
sector (as % of GDP) (credit/GDP ratio). This ratio synthesizes cyclical properties 
of credit and GDP and is helpful in detecting excessive credit indebtedness, which 
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is important from the macro-prudential regulation viewpoint. Recent papers on 
new approaches to macro-prudential regulation emphasize the feasibility of 
credit/GDP ratio as a potential anchor for the implementation of countercyclical 
capital buffers under Basle III. It outperforms such measures as real credit or 
money aggregates (Drehmann, Borio, Tsatsaronis, 2011) as a warning indicator of 
credit “overheating”. Moritz Schularick and Alan M. Taylor (2012, forthcoming) 
also find that credit/GDP is a good predictor of financial crises  in the long-run, as 
they rely on a dataset for 14 countries over the years 1870-2008. Moreover, they 
show that countries with high credit/GDP ratios are not only more prone to 
banking crises, but are also more likely to experience other types of financial 
turmoil, namely, more dangerous stock market busts. 
I use credit relative to GDP to construct stylized credit cycles at global and 
regional levels over 1980-2010. The starting point of the time span is associated 
with the beginning of a mighty wave of financial globalization, according to Rajan 
and Zingales (2003). It turns out that there has actually been a single credit cycle 
over this period at global level (measured “from peak to peak”).  It covered 1990-
2005, with the downturn phase lasting from 1990 to 1997. The dating of regional 
credit cycles is not uniform, and I generalize the findings in Section 2 of the paper.  
In addition to describing cyclical patterns of cred it at global and regional 
dimensions, in Section 3 an attempt is made to evaluate the role of a given region 
and country in the transmission of credit cycles at cross- and intra-regional levels. 
To this end, I resort to computing the so-called net spill-over index (NSI), 
introduced in Credit Cycles and their Role for Macro-prudential Policy (2011). It 
measures a degree to what a region or a country is subject to cred it cycle spillover 
from others or exerts predominant influence itself. I also focus on the components 
of this metric – the total number of counterparts to which a region or a country is 
connected, the number of exogenous (subject to influence from other countries‟ 
credit cycles) and endogenous (impact on other countries‟ credit cycles) links. To 
calculate NSI the methodology of vector auto -regressions (VAR) is applied. It ties 
the paper with a burgeoning literature on financial spillovers and contagion where 
such econometric techniques are used (Helbling et al., 2010; Xu, 2011).  
At regional level the main finding is related to the US credit cycle, which 
proves to be the most influential in the world. It has directly led 3 other regional 
credit cycles in 1980-2010, experiencing exogenous influence of none itself. It 
again justifies the statement that when the US sneezes, the world catches cold! At 
country level I examine how individual NSIs and their components are related to 
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the number of banking crises episodes in 1980-2010. A special dataset is created to 
reach the purpose, combining Reinhart-Rogoff (2011) and Laeven databases  
(2010). I establish that the regions exerting predominant influence over their 
counterparts and having a higher number of total connections at the same time 
experience fewer banking crises.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data, methodology 
and cyclical patterns of regional credit cycles; Section 3 introduces net -spillover 
indices at regional and country levels and studies the impact of its components on 
banking crises episodes; Section 4 concludes, indicating avenues for future 
research. 
 
2. Global and regional credit cycles: methodology and properties 
To extract global and regional credit cycles credit/GDP ratios for 94 
countries are used. The source of information is World Development Indicators  
(WDI). The countries with missing values of this indicator for at least a single year 
in 1980-2010 have been eliminated from the initial sample, no interpolation has 
been carried out. 
The global credit cycle is derived as follows. First, the credit/GDP series for 
all the countries are detrended. To this end, I employ Hodrick–Prescott filter 
(1997). So, I consider a credit cycle as a deviation from trend in a country‟s 
credit/GDP series. It is necessary to specify that relative deviation from trend is 
computed (
trendGDPcredit
trendGDPcreditGDPcredit
i
ii
_/
_// 
). Second, the constructed series are 
normalized to obtain an individual country‟s stylized credit cycle: relative 
deviations from trend for each year less mean for 1980–2010 divided by standard 
deviation for 1980–2010. Finally, the first principal component for the series is 
extracted and normalized according to the described procedure. The result is a 
standardized global cycle presented below (figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Global credit cycle. 
 It turns out that there has actually been a single credit cycle over this period 
at global level (measured “from peak to peak”). It covered 1990-2005, with the 
downturn phase lasting from 1990 to 1997. The beginning of the downturn meshes 
well with a burst of systemic financial crises in Latin America (Mexico, Brazil, 
etc.) and banking crises in Scandinavian countries. The trough of the cycle is 
associated with a number of serious financial crises in NICs. The upturn of the 
global credit cycle was resilient and almost unaffected by the 2001 dotcom crisis 
and US recession. 
 It is also noteworthy that both upper turning points of the cycle are reached 
at comparable level. It indicates that the 2008–2009 crisis was not preceded by any 
supernatural credit overhang, the global credit indebtedness in 2005 was 13% 
higher than in 1990. The upper turning point registered in 2005 and, say, not in 
2006 or 2007, as one may intuitively have expected, seems an important empirical 
finding as well. 
 Now I turn to regional credit cycles. The names and county composition of 
regions are from WDI (Appendix 1). The methodology of cycle extraction is in 
line with the one used for the global credit cycle. Standardized regional credit 
cycles are displayed below (Figure 2a, b, c, d, e, f, g).  In case of  North America 
regional credit cycle is equivalent to the US, as Canada and Bermuda contain 
missing values in their series. 
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Figure 2. Regional credit cycle. 
 Regional credit cycles are far from being uniform in shape.  
In case of the US one may decipher at least 2 cycles: from 1986 to 1999 and 
from 1999 to 2007 (measured “from peak to peak”). The upturns and downturns of 
the cycles adequately correspond to overall US macroeconomic performance, 
reflecting such episodes as the New Economy boom in 1996-2000, sub-prime 
mortgage expansion in 2003-2007 as well as busts of respective bubbles in 2001 
and 2008-2009 with significant credit depth deterioration.  
The European credit cycle lasted from 1991 to 2004, with 1997 being the 
trough. In 2004-2009 there was a clear downward trend with a local trough in 
2009. Like in the US, the downturn in 2005-2009 in the European credit cycle was 
moderate. Two reasons may account for it. First, active bail-outs carried out by 
monetary authorities helped avoid massive write-offs in traditional loan portfolios. 
Second, the reduction in GDP partly ameliorated the shrinkage in credit volumes, 
as business and financial cycles in advanced economies are well synchronized. 
As for East Asia, its credit cycle covered the span between 1994 and 2005, 
with 2001 being the trough. The downturn is completely associated with the crisis 
in the NICs. Again, the downturn in 2006-2009 was relatively mild.  
In Latin America the credit cycle embraced 1993-2009. There was a steady 
and long downturn between 1993 and 2003. So, the 1990s could also be treated as 
a lost decade for Latin America from the financial development perspective, just 
like “flat” credit/GDP levels observed in the 1980s. But the 2008-2009 global 
recession passed unnoticed for Latin America with a pronounced upward trend in 
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credit/GDP ratio. Almost identical cyclical pattern is found in case of Middle East 
and North Africa. 
In South Asia the credit cycle lasted from 1992 to 2006. There was a 
protracted period of low credit/GDP levels between 1995 and 2001 which 
coincided with the financial disruption in the NICs.  
Sub-Saharan Africa experienced a substantial upturn between 1999 and 2005 
after mixed dynamics in the preceding years. Yet, it was reversed in 2006-2009. 
To summarize the stylized facts about global and regional credit cycles, one 
may state that their average duration is 12-15 years, almost equally divided 
between upturns and downturns. Despite initial expectations that the downturn of 
the last credit cycle could be extremely deep, the empirics don‟t lend much support 
to them. For all the regions there is “a ceiling” and “a floor” curbing the amplitude 
of credit cycles. The first is a 1,5 standard deviation above the mean for 1980-
2010, the second is the same value below the mean.  
 
3. Cross- and intra-regional credit cycles’ spillovers 
Credit cycles in different regions and countries don‟t occur in vacuum. 
Modern banking systems are deeply interconnected, so credit cycles are sure to 
spill over both at cross- and intra-regional levels. My purpose in this section is to 
establish links between regional cycles, thus, finding out which of them strongly 
affect other regions‟ cycles and which are subject to external influence.  
This analysis is helpful to evaluate risks of banking cycles‟ contagion. Its 
methodology rests on the use of vector auto -regressions (VARs). I use an 
unrestricted VAR model and treat all the standardized regional credit cycle time 
series as endogenous variables. I experiment with different number of lags, testing 
for optimal lag length and overall model stability. According to Akaike and 
Schwartz information criteria a model with a 2-period lag should be selected. It 
proves to be stable, as inverse roots of AR characteristic polynomial lie inside the 
unit circle (Appendix 2). Then I fill in a table displaying connections between the 
variables. The criterion is a t-statistic that is equal or exceeds 2 in respective 
regressions. The result is the following table. 
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t=2 US_STD_CYCLE EURO_STD_CYCLE EASIA_STD_CYCLE LATAM_STD_CYCLE SASIA_STD_CYCLE MENA_STD_CYCLE SSAFR_STD_CYCLE sub_to_infl
US_STD_CYCLE 0
EURO_STD_CYCLE + + + 3
EASIA_STD_CYCLE + + + 3
LATAM_STD_CYCLE + + + + 4
SASIA_STD_CYCLE 2+ + 3
MENA_STD_CYCLE 2+ 2
SSAFR_STD_CYCLE 2+ 2+ 2+ + 7
exert_infl 5 5 5 1 3 3 0 0  
„+‟ denotes the presence of a link, „2+‟ means that both lags of the respective 
independent variable affect the given one. So, for example, in column 1 it is seen 
that the standardized US credit cycle takes a 2-year lead of the one of South Asia 
and Sub-Saharan Africa and a one-year lead of the credit cycle of East Asia. The 
last right-hand column contains information on the number of  links a given 
country is subject to, whereas the lower line summarizes data on the number of 
links this country generates itself. 
 Consequently, one can conclude that the US credit cycle is the most 
influential, as it produces 5 links with 3 regions and remains totally unaffected 
itself. Then come Europe and East Asia. Europe receives feedback from itself, East 
Asia and Latin America. East Asia is affected by the US, European and its own 
credit cycles. Surprisingly, it seems that the US credit cycle affects Europe in a 
“roundabout” way – via East Asia. Thus, one may conjecture that a banking crisis 
(or any other financial turmoil) originated in the US will be particularly contagious 
for Europe if previously amplified in Japan and/or China that shape the credit cycle 
in East Asia. 
 Middle East and North Africa as well as South Asia are in neutral position in 
a sense that that the first exercises quite a limited influence and the second has a 
zero balance of links at all. Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa are primarily 
subject to influence by other regions‟ credit cycles. 
 It is also interesting to evaluate the net influence effect for each region. To 
this end, I resort to the net spill-over index (NSI). It is calculated as the number of 
endogenous links less the number of exogenous ones divided by total sum of links 
attributed to the region. By definition it ranges from -1 to 1. The value of -1 
indicates that the region only receives external impulses, i.e. its credit cycle is 
determined by developments in other regions. On the contrary, NSI equal to 1 
means the region is absolutely independent of external influence and shapes credit 
cycles of its counterparts. So, I compute and visualize NSI values (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3. Regional NSI values. 
 Having NSI value significantly positive or close to1 makes the region almost 
immune to any banking shocks originated in other places. However, this position 
also transforms this region into a systemically important. It means that any 
significant shock generated within the region may be quickly propagated and 
amplified, undermining global financial stability. This fact imposes great 
responsibility over monetary authorities and banking regulators in the US, Europe 
and East Asia. It additionally points to the necessity of cooperation of these key 
regions in macro-prudential regulation of  banking. The same is true for Middle 
East and North Africa, though this region has a much more “isolated” credit cycle.  
 The same approach to assessing credit cycle links could be applied at intra-
regional level, as it helps identify countries disseminating their financial influence 
and those that only passively adjust to external impact. Again I report figures of 
NSIs values
2
 (Figure 4a, b, c, d, e, f). 
                                                                    
2
 The output of respective VAR models and proofs of their stability are available from the author upon request.  
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Figure 4. Country-level net spill-over indices. 
One should pay particular attention to country-level NSIs in Europe and East Asia 
because they have been found crucial in terms of influence on other regions‟ credit 
cycles. The countries characterized by positive NSI values in Europe and East Asia 
are not only resistant to financial shocks that may occur within the two regions, but 
also have significant potential to exert negative impact on other regions if a shock 
arises precisely in the given countries. So, the analysis provides preliminary 
guidelines for revealing countries with systemically important credit cycles
3
. 
 In Europe and Central Asia the UK, Germany and Turkey are on the top-list 
with NSI value equal to 1. They are followed by Switzerland, Finland, Greece and  
Spain. The fact that Greece and Spain have positive NSI values means that 
financial conditions in the countries affect other countries‟ performance, both in 
Europe and beyond. So, this finding additionally explains why the 2010-2012 
Greek crisis turned out to be so difficult to resolve. It is also worth mentioning that 
the Greek credit cycle leads the Spanish one, whereas the financial conditions in 
Spain directly affect Portugal, Ireland and Switzerland.  
 In East Asia the most striking thing is that China has an NSI equal to -1. 
This fact, however, doesn‟t necessarily imply that this country is easily affected by 
its regional counterparts‟ credit cycles. It is a significant financial power and links 
with other regions may be much more important for China. If extra-regional links 
are taken into consideration, NSI value may be quite different. A plausible 
explanation for the result obtained is that China experiences influence by the 
countries whose credit cycles may be particularly tied to the US and Europe 
(Korea, Rep., New Zealand, Malaysia). So, this could be an indirect impact of 
other regions‟ credit cycles. In other regions there are also some unexpected results 
of NSI computation, like Saudi Arabia in MENA or Chile in Latin America which 
have received negative scores. Nevertheless, the regions these countries belong to 
are not of systemic importance and the result changes little in global transmission 
of credit cycles, though really deserves further research and robustness checks.  
 Now I turn to examining a possible relationship between the computed NSIs 
at country level and the intensity of banking crises. I combine two special datasets 
on the incidence of banking crises that cover the period of 1980-2010 - Reinhart-
Rogoff (2011) and Laeven (2010). They overlap to a great extent. In the cases they 
                                                                    
3 As the time-series in the analysis include only 31 observations, it is impossible to construct a genuinely global VAR 
model that would evaluate dependence of a given country on all other countries’ or regions’ credit cycles. So, the 
conclusions made may be subject to certain extensions given the suggested comprehensive analysis is conducted. 
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contradict, I rely on Reinhart-Rogoff database (2011) as a more recently updated 
data source. Thus, I assemble a sample of 65 countries in which at least one 
episode of banking crisis took place in 1980-2010. Figure 5 visualizes the data.  
 
Figure 5. Number of banking crises per country, 1980-2010. 
 Then I make a regression of the number of banking crises (BANKCR) per 
country on a constant and two independent variables – the respective NSI of the 
country (NSI_c)  and that of the region it belongs to (NSI_reg). As the dependent 
variable may take on only integer values, I use the so-called Poisson regression 
(Appendix 3a). 
 At first glance the formal result is that the regression is of acceptable quality 
as all the predictors are significant. The main qualitative conclusion based on the 
estimated equation is that the greater NSI a country has, the more pro ne to banking 
crises it is. Also, the number of banking crises seems inversely connected with 
regional NSI. So, having a high NSI value within a region may be a pro-crisis 
14 
 
factor, whereas a high NSI value at regional level may be a buffer to financial 
turmoils. 
 However, the robustness of the results is to be checked as they may be 
biased due to overdispersion in the dependent variable, which means that the 
equality of the conditional mean and variance is broken. This is a typical problem 
with Poisson regressions. To establish if one can rely on the results, a goodness-of-
fit test is carried out. Its idea is to regress residuals of the estimated regression on 
fitted values of the dependent variable (constant is suppressed). If the coefficient is 
significant, it means that the basic premise of Poisson regression is violated and its 
results are unreliable. The output of this auxilliary regression is presented in 
Appendix 3b. As t-statistic is not significant even at 10%-level, conditional mean 
and variance of the dependent variable can be considered equal and the obtained 
Poisson regression appropriate.  
 Anyway, I treat the qualitative conclusions with certain caution: the positive 
association between high NSI values within a region and the number of banking 
crises per country may be a mere reflection of the fact that such regions as Sub -
Saharan Africa and Latin America have much higher average NSIs at country 
levels in comparison with Europe and East Asia (0,19 and 0,43 vs. 0,06 and 0,13). 
Further research is needed in this area. 
As a starting point of it, I disaggregate the NSIs and use four predictors for 
banking crises – the difference between endogenous and exogenous links of a 
country‟s credit cycle at regional and country levels (i.e. the numerators of the 
respective NSIs – DIF_C, DIF_REG) and total sums of a country‟s credit cycles 
(i.e. the denominators of the respective NSIs – TOTINFL_C, TOTINFL_REG). 
The rest of the estimation is as described above. The result is presented in 
Appendices 3c, d. It sheds additional light on the connection between credit cycle 
links and banking crises. It is the cross–regional dimension that matters more than 
intra-regional interactions: the regions that exert predominant influence over their 
counterparts and have a higher number of total connections at the same time 
experience fewer banking crises.  
 
4. Conclusions 
In the paper standardized credit cycles were constructed for 7 regions and 94 
countries. The cyclical patterns of the regional cycles have been studied and 
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discussed and the notion of a global credit cycle have been introduced. Some 
regularities in their structure and duration have been discovered. 
Regional cycles prove to be largely interdependent. The US credit cycle is 
the most influential and autonomous among them. Europe and East Asia come 
next. Other regions passively adjust to credit cyclicality of the mentioned regions. 
It has a direct implication for the conduct of economic policy. Macro-prudential 
measures should be coordinated and credit cycles should be carefully monitored 
precisely with respect to these three regions. 
I have also studied the interdependence of country-level credit cycles and the 
impact of regional and country-level credit cycles on the intensity of banking 
crises. The regions that exert predominant influence over their counterparts and 
have a higher number of total connections at the same time experience fewer 
banking crises. Anyway, further effort is needed to verify these conclusions. 
 This quest could also be based on a different methodology. Using tools of 
network analysis looks quite promising in this respect. This approach may create 
additional value added as it is aimed at visualizing links between credit cycles.  
Some aspects of VAR models could also be developed. For example, genera l 
response functions could be estimated to study multilateral credit cycle links in 
more detail.  
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Appendix 1 
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF COUNTRIES 
North America                                                  
The US                                                               
Europe & Central Asia  
Cyprus 
Denmark 
Finland 
Germany 
Greece 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Italy 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United 
Kingdom 
Turkey 
East Asia & Pacific 
Japan 
Korea, Rep. 
New Zealand 
Singapore 
China 
Fiji 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Myanmar 
Papua New 
Guinea 
Philippines 
Solomon 
Islands 
Thailand 
Tonga 
Vanuatu 
Latin America & Caribbean 
Bahamas, The  
Antigua and Barbuda 
Argentina 
Belize 
Bolivia 
Chile 
Costa Rica 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Grenada 
Guatemala 
Guyana 
Honduras 
Jamaica 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
St. Kitts and Nevis 
St. Lucia 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
Uruguay 
Middle East & North Africa 
Israel 
Malta 
Saudi Arabia 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Algeria 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  
Jordan 
Syrian Arab Republic 
 
South Asia 
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Bangladesh 
India 
Maldives 
Nepal 
Pakistan 
Sri Lanka 
 
Sub–Saharan Africa 
Benin 
Botswana 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Central African 
Republic 
Chad 
Congo, Rep.  
Cote d'Ivoire 
Gabon 
Gambia, The 
Ghana 
Kenya 
Lesotho 
Madagascar 
Mali 
Mauritius 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Senegal 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
Sudan 
Swaziland 
Togo 
Benin 
Botswana 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Central African 
Republic 
Chad 
Congo, Rep.  
Cote d'Ivoire 
Gabon 
Gambia, The 
Ghana 
Kenya 
Lesotho 
Madagascar 
Mali 
Mauritius 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Senegal 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
Sudan 
Swaziland 
Togo 
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Appendix 2 
VAR MODEL OF REGIONAL CREDIT CYCLE SPILLOVERS 
 
        
         US_STD_CYCLE SSAFR_STD_CYCLE SASIA_STD_CYCLE MENA_STD_CYCLE LATAM_STD_CYCLE EURO_STD_CYCLE EASIA_STD_CYCLE 
        
        US_STD_CYCLE(-1) -0.019537  0.236139  0.339765 -0.141972 -0.121501  0.116950  0.144551 
  (0.25902)  (0.11609)  (0.16489)  (0.13114)  (0.12201)  (0.11418)  (0.08908) 
 [-0.07543] [ 2.03407] [ 2.06057] [-1.08263] [-0.99586] [ 1.02430] [ 1.62265] 
        
US_STD_CYCLE(-2)  0.035311 -0.256298 -0.386742 -0.075254  0.232524 -0.019942 -0.286125 
  (0.26024)  (0.11664)  (0.16566)  (0.13175)  (0.12258)  (0.11471)  (0.08950) 
 [ 0.13569] [-2.19740] [-2.33451] [-0.57118] [ 1.89693] [-0.17384] [-3.19688] 
        
SSAFR_STD_CYCLE(-1) -0.111058  0.308055  0.181239 -0.068390 -0.049393  0.349148  0.278597 
  (0.40911)  (0.18336)  (0.26043)  (0.20712)  (0.19270)  (0.18033)  (0.14070) 
 [-0.27147] [ 1.68006] [ 0.69592] [-0.33019] [-0.25632] [ 1.93613] [ 1.98006] 
        
SSAFR_STD_CYCLE(-2) -0.181994 -0.099975  0.255133 -0.238816  0.016698 -0.048884 -0.180746 
  (0.39740)  (0.17811)  (0.25298)  (0.20119)  (0.18719)  (0.17517)  (0.13667) 
 [-0.45797] [-0.56131] [ 1.00852] [-1.18700] [ 0.08921] [-0.27906] [-1.32246] 
        
SASIA_STD_CYCLE(-1)  0.064015  0.070400  0.573272  0.091523 -0.397663  0.026503  0.036083 
  (0.39079)  (0.17515)  (0.24877)  (0.19785)  (0.18407)  (0.17226)  (0.13440) 
 [ 0.16381] [ 0.40194] [ 2.30441] [ 0.46259] [-2.16033] [ 0.15386] [ 0.26847] 
        
SASIA_STD_CYCLE(-2) -0.168939 -0.309402 -0.056209  0.176694  0.122908  0.073062  0.103531 
  (0.32727)  (0.14668)  (0.20834)  (0.16569)  (0.15416)  (0.14426)  (0.11256) 
 [-0.51620] [-2.10932] [-0.26980] [ 1.06641] [ 0.79730] [ 0.50645] [ 0.91981] 
        
MENA_STD_CYCLE(-1) -0.135915 -0.285049 -0.252823  0.547303  0.450047  0.345156  0.212836 
  (0.41883)  (0.18772)  (0.26662)  (0.21204)  (0.19728)  (0.18462)  (0.14405) 
 [-0.32451] [-1.51849] [-0.94824] [ 2.58109] [ 2.28123] [ 1.86955] [ 1.47756] 
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MENA_STD_CYCLE(-2) -0.067059 -0.017962  0.074749 -0.550669 -0.321354  0.143044 -0.001959 
  (0.40503)  (0.18154)  (0.25784)  (0.20506)  (0.19078)  (0.17854)  (0.13930) 
 [-0.16556] [-0.09894] [ 0.28990] [-2.68542] [-1.68439] [ 0.80120] [-0.01406] 
        
LATAM_STD_CYCLE(-1) -0.289642 -0.304186  0.035670  0.430913  0.333409  0.312394 -0.038833 
  (0.49982)  (0.22402)  (0.31818)  (0.25305)  (0.23543)  (0.22032)  (0.17190) 
 [-0.57949] [-1.35786] [ 0.11211] [ 1.70290] [ 1.41617] [ 1.41791] [-0.22590] 
        
LATAM_STD_CYCLE(-2) -0.653246  0.121966  0.070256  0.272107 -0.306584 -0.461788  0.136527 
  (0.43792)  (0.19628)  (0.27878)  (0.22171)  (0.20628)  (0.19304)  (0.15061) 
 [-1.49169] [ 0.62140] [ 0.25202] [ 1.22731] [-1.48629] [-2.39225] [ 0.90648] 
        
EURO_STD_CYCLE(-1)  0.411891 -0.515730  0.065793  0.080229  0.651669  0.513157 -0.127176 
  (0.54266)  (0.24322)  (0.34545)  (0.27473)  (0.25561)  (0.23920)  (0.18663) 
 [ 0.75903] [-2.12045] [ 0.19046] [ 0.29202] [ 2.54948] [ 2.14529] [-0.68143] 
        
EURO_STD_CYCLE(-2) -0.469521  1.070260 -0.055128 -0.342069  0.069515  0.244328  0.544924 
  (0.56092)  (0.25140)  (0.35708)  (0.28398)  (0.26421)  (0.24725)  (0.19291) 
 [-0.83705] [ 4.25712] [-0.15439] [-1.20454] [ 0.26310] [ 0.98817] [ 2.82469] 
        
EASIA_STD_CYCLE(-1)  0.134815  0.503279 -0.053700  0.090423 -0.099207 -0.654582  0.427332 
  (0.55358)  (0.24811)  (0.35240)  (0.28027)  (0.26075)  (0.24402)  (0.19039) 
 [ 0.24353] [ 2.02842] [-0.15238] [ 0.32263] [-0.38046] [-2.68252] [ 2.24451] 
        
EASIA_STD_CYCLE(-2)  0.922586 -0.631274 -0.376378  0.223769  0.593986 -0.132177 -0.239575 
  (0.61744)  (0.27673)  (0.39305)  (0.31259)  (0.29083)  (0.27216)  (0.21235) 
 [ 1.49422] [-2.28117] [-0.95758] [ 0.71585] [ 2.04238] [-0.48565] [-1.12821] 
        
C -0.039760 -0.049840  0.018680  0.070903 -0.056490 -0.042513 -0.042033 
  (0.18109)  (0.08116)  (0.11528)  (0.09168)  (0.08530)  (0.07982)  (0.06228) 
 [-0.21956] [-0.61406] [ 0.16204] [ 0.77336] [-0.66226] [-0.53259] [-0.67489] 
        
         R-squared  0.554444  0.914981  0.826386  0.885836  0.900534  0.919197  0.946138 
 Adj. R-squared  0.108889  0.829962  0.652771  0.771672  0.801068  0.838395  0.892276 
 Sum sq. resids  12.30239  2.471303  4.985434  3.153274  2.729528  2.390380  1.455164 
 S.E. equation  0.937412  0.420145  0.596743  0.474588  0.441550  0.413209  0.322398 
 F-statistic  1.244388  10.76210  4.759889  7.759319  9.053673  11.37585  17.56600 
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 Log likelihood -28.71543 -5.442239 -15.61797 -8.975825 -6.883296 -4.959490  2.237348 
 Akaike AIC  3.014857  1.409810  2.111584  1.653505  1.509193  1.376517  0.880183 
 Schwarz SC  3.722079  2.117032  2.818806  2.360727  2.216415  2.083739  1.587405 
 Mean dependent -0.017586 -0.035862  0.051379  0.012414 -0.089310 -0.050000 -0.080690 
 S.D. dependent  0.993035  1.018888  1.012697  0.993201  0.989982  1.027879  0.982282 
        
         Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  3.30E-06      
 Determinant resid covariance  2.02E-08      
 Log likelihood -31.10513      
 Akaike information criterion  9.386561      
 Schwarz criterion  14.33711      
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Appendix 3 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF BANKING CRISES 
3a. 
 
Dependent Variable: BANKCR   
Method: ML/QML - Poisson Count (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Sample: 1 65    
Included observations: 65   
Convergence achieved after 4 iterations  
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 1.654661 0.063686 25.98173 0.0000 
NSI_C 0.163597 0.077761 2.103841 0.0354 
NSI_REG -0.304470 0.085987 -3.540890 0.0004 
     
     R-squared 0.160829    Mean dependent var 6.015385 
Adjusted R-squared 0.133759    S.D. dependent var 3.384211 
S.E. of regression 3.149755    Akaike info criterion 5.203372 
Sum squared resid 615.0995    Schwarz criterion 5.303729 
Log likelihood -166.1096    Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.242970 
Restr. log likelihood -175.3187    LR statistic 18.41812 
Avg. log likelihood -2.555532    Prob(LR statistic) 0.000100 
     
      
 
 
 
 
3b. 
 
Dependent Variable: SRESID 2^-1  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1 65    
Included observations: 65   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     BANKCR_F 0.091053 0.056463 1.612608 0.1118 
     
     R-squared -0.027194    Mean dependent var 0.720036 
Adjusted R-squared -0.027194    S.D. dependent var 2.763834 
S.E. of regression 2.801161    Akaike info criterion 4.913210 
Sum squared resid 502.1762    Schwarz criterion 4.946662 
Log likelihood -158.6793    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.926409 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.202063    
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3c. 
Dependent Variable: BANKCR   
Method: ML/QML - Poisson Count (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Sample: 1 65    
Included observations: 65   
Convergence achieved after 4 iterations  
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 2.164921 0.224057 9.662379 0.0000 
DIF_C 0.021194 0.017598 1.204315 0.2285 
DIF_REG -0.074740 0.017337 -4.310933 0.0000 
TOTINFL_C -0.015909 0.017831 -0.892246 0.3723 
TOTINFL_REG -0.082218 0.042195 -1.948516 0.0514 
     
     R-squared 0.178384    Mean dependent var 6.015385 
Adjusted R-squared 0.123610    S.D. dependent var 3.384211 
S.E. of regression 3.168154    Akaike info criterion 5.196804 
Sum squared resid 602.2319    Schwarz criterion 5.364065 
Log likelihood -163.8961    Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.262799 
Restr. log likelihood -175.3187    LR statistic 22.84505 
Avg. log likelihood -2.521479    Prob(LR statistic) 0.000136 
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
3d. 
Dependent Variable: SRESID 2^-1  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1 65    
Included observations: 65   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     BANKCR_F 0.084919 0.060028 1.414662 0.1620 
     
     R-squared -0.023269    Mean dependent var 0.690398 
Adjusted R-squared -0.023269    S.D. dependent var 2.959604 
S.E. of regression 2.993840    Akaike info criterion 5.046256 
Sum squared resid 573.6371    Schwarz criterion 5.079708 
Log likelihood -163.0033    Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.059455 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.230269    
     
      
 
